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Causes  and  consequences  of  deregulation  and  restructuring  in  utility  markets  in  US  states 
continue to draw heated debate. It is unclear why different utilities choose retail restructuring, 
price caps or sliding-scale plans. Various economic and political reasons lend themselves to 
explaining  regulatory  decisions.  This  study  uses  a  stylized  capture  model  to  formulate 
predictions  about  regulators’  net  benefits  from  a  particular  form  of  deregulation.  Empirical 
hazard  model  evaluates  the  revealed  choice  at  each  regulator-utility  pair.  Among  state-level 
political  factors,  frequency  and  timing  of  commissioner  re-elections,  system  of  selection  of 
commissioners, and party composition of the commissions and state legislatures are significant 
in explaining the pattern of deregulation. Utilities’ prices, capacity and scope of operations help 
explain  the  timing  of  deregulation.  Market  concentration  contributes.  A  negative  significant 
association between the prevalence of restructuring (and sliding-scale plans), and of price caps 
across utility industries is identified. 
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Since the late 1800s, regulation of public utilities in the United States  has undergone  many 
changes in structure and conceptual approach. The most recent upheaval took place in the early 
1990s, when many state public service commissions abandoned traditional cost-plus ratemaking 
regime for performance-based regulation. Some states fixed prices that utilities could charge, 
some introduced financial incentives for utilities to exceed certain performance standards, and 
others allowed utilities to compete among themselves for customers. Utilities went along with, if 
not welcomed, the changes. The first large incentive programs in the gas distribution industry 
were introduced fifteen years ago, and many states have adopted them since then. As of 2007, 
half of U.S. states and two thirds of utilities still operated under rate-of-return regulation. To this 
day, motives behind regulatory reform across individual states remain unclear. Understanding 
them  can  help  us  determine  the  relative  importance  of  legitimate  economic  factors,  and  of 
political capture motives, in bringing about policy reform. This understanding can also help us 
predict future patterns of deregulation. 
This  paper  extends  empirical  evidence  on  factors  behind  regulatory  reform  in  utility 
industries, using panel data on all natural-gas utilities in the continental United States. Among 
state-level  political  factors,  frequency  and  timing  of  commissioner  re-elections,  system  of 
selection of commissioners, and party composition of the commissions and state legislatures are 
significant  in  explaining  the  pattern  of  deregulation.  Demonstration  effects  from  regulatory 
regimes in surrounding states and particularly from other utility industries in a state appear to 
play a role. A negative significant association between the prevalence of restructuring, and of 
price cap deregulation across states is identified. This may result from the adoption of price cap 
regulation to block restructuring. It may also result from the preference for price cap regulation 
in  less  competitive  regions,  and  restructuring  in  regions  with  a  sufficient  potential  for 
competition. Finally, utilities’ prices and capacity, and market concentration, are shown to help 
explain the outcome and timing of regulatory reform. 
 
1. Background of regulation 
Prior to the 1860s, federal government oversaw utility industries from wellheads to city gates. 
Individual  municipalities  oversaw  distribution  companies.  Because  of  simple  structure  and 





the 1860s and 1920s, utility industries became more integrated, as companies increased scope of 
their services and regional reach, and their operations spanned out across multiple commodities. 
Trusts and monopolies arose in railroad and other public utility industries. State commissions 
emerged, as a Populist (1880s) and Progressive (1890-1910s) response to these trusts. In fact, 
most state commissions called themselves railroad commissions for many decades even though 
their function included telecommunications, energy, gas, water and other utilities. The primary 
objective of the commissions was initially to protect core (i.e., residential and small commercial) 
customers from being abused to the benefit of larger consumers or utilities themselves (Stigler & 
Friedland, 1962; Priest, 1993). Over time, state commissions took on more responsibilities, with 
regard to infrastructure provision and enforcement of efficiency at companies. Today they are the 
most influential body responsible for supervision of transportation and distribution companies in 
utility industries. 
State  commissions  have  adopted  different  regulatory  approaches  across  different  utility 
industries, depending on the complexity of service to consumers, ownership and cost of key 
assets, and prospect of technological innovation. Gas distribution market was traditionally kept 
under  rate-of-return  regulation,  because  of  its  status  as  classical  natural  monopoly.  State 
commissions used tight regulation in order to hold utilities’ returns and consumer prices within 
narrow  ranges.  In  the  1960s,  rate-of-return  regulation  regime  came  under  attack  for  giving 
utilities  insufficient  incentives  to  manage  costs  and  revenues,  and  encouraging  them  to 
strategically overcapitalize and pass up risky long-term cost-reducing investments (Averch & 
Johnson, 1962). In protecting core customers’ bottom line, regulators had discouraged utilities 
from marketing to off-grid industrial consumers and procuring gas in innovative ways. 
In 1978, the National Energy Act unified the intrastate and interstate transmission markets, 
and Orders 380 and 436 gave gas providers open access to transmission companies’ pipelines. 
Through the 1978 Natural Gas Policy Act and the 1989 Wellhead Decontrol Act, wellhead prices 
became  competitive.  Utilities’  options  for  using  their  resources  and  procuring  commodity 
widened. As the national gas market became more integrated, state officials, consumer advocates 
and  utilities  themselves  started  calling  for  lighter-handed,  more  flexible  and  more  efficient 
regulatory  regimes.  The  1992  FERC  Order  636  facilitated  regulatory  reform  by  extending 





Price cap regulation became debated as the means of promoting efficiency. Price caps gave 
utilities the full reward for efficiency in capital investment and in risk-taking in gas procurement 
and infrastructure management. The difference between price caps and rate-of-return regulation 
was, in reality, dampened by regulatory imperfections and constraints. Regulatory lags, rate case 
moratoria and prudence reviews reduced the efficiency disadvantages of rate-of-return regulation. 
Accounting for Z factors in the calculation of rates, and possibility of ex post renegotiation of 
allowed rates reduced the utilities’ incentives under price caps. Even though price cap regulation 
required less regulatory oversight than rate-of-return regulation, it did not represent true regime 
change because – theoretically and empirically – it did not depart sufficiently from the rate-of-
return  regulation  paradigm.  Companies’  costs  and  their  allowed  rates  remained  tied,  and 
companies’  sunk  investments  remained  protected  by  a  safety  net.  Price-cap  regulation  also 
required regulators to correctly predict future costs and technology improvements, else utilities 
could  earn  excessive  returns  or  default  on  their  responsibilities.  Perhaps  because  of  these 
reservations, price cap regulation was adopted in a “gradual and sometimes haphazard manner” 
in the United States (Crew & Kleindorfer, 1996, p. 212). 
In the  mid-1990s, several state commissions started advancing incentive or performance-
based  regulation  to  give  utilities  incentives  in  particular  areas  of  operation.  Rewards  for 
outstanding performance were reflected in their allowed consumer rates. The first stab at such 
deregulation, named capacity-release and off-system sale plans, allowed utilities to share benefits 
from exceptional performance in utilization of marginal resources.  The first was adopted in 
North Carolina in 1993. Some states, starting with Mississippi in 1994, introduced monetary 
rewards  for  superb  customer  service.  When  these  programs  were  deemed  successful,  more 
aggressive  incentive  programs  were  authorized  to  give  utilities  a  wider  space  for  decision-
making, such as attracting off-system industrial customers (earnings sharing mechanisms), and 
purchasing the commodity from various sources (gas cost incentive mechanisms). Utilities were 
allowed  to  influence  their  rate  of  return  on  capital  by  retaining  a  portion  of  the  difference 
between actual and benchmark costs or revenues (Comnes et al., 1995). 
Sliding-scale  programs  currently  used  by  US  state  commissions  have  several  major 
variations. Margin-sharing plans promote efficient management and divestiture of resources on 
the margin: Off-system sales and pipeline capacity release plans reward utilities for using excess 





efficient  gas procurement, in commodities, futures and derivatives markets. Earnings-sharing 
mechanisms encourage negotiation of special contracts with new industrial customers to make 
gas  competitive  with  other  fuels.  Once  again,  adoption  of  sliding-scale  programs  did  not 
represent a true regulatory reform, merely partial, controlled deregulation. Similarly to price-cap 
regulation, sliding-scale plans retained much of the link between companies’ costs and prices, 
and continued to restrict companies’ returns to be within certain ranges. 
In 2000, state commissions started departing from the regulatory paradigm based on viewing 
utilities as natural monopolies. They restructured the gas distribution market by unbundling gas 
distribution service into several service areas, and approving several utilities and independent 
marketers to compete in individual segments. Refer to Table 1. Introduction of consumer-choice 
programs  arguably  represented  true  regulatory  reform,  as  it  brought  about  a  new  view  and 
treatment  of  individual  utilities,  industry-wide  structural  changes,  and  changes  in  state 
commission’ role. Moreover, entry of unregulated interstate marketers gave states access to new 
sources of gas, undercut existing vertical regional supply chains, and helped to further unify the 
gas market. 
 
  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
Sliding scale plans (Utilities)
a  28  39  48  56  60  63  70  70  71 
Price caps (Utilities)  13  15  16  18  19  20  21  21  21 
Consumer choice (States)  0  1  8  14  19  19  20  20  20 
a This count does not include Wyoming utilities (44), who all receive 10% of gas cost savings under state 
legislation. 
 
Table 1. Cumulative Number of Policies in the Dataset, by Year 
 
2. Regulatory literature 
Most research on public utilities has focused on the electric and telecommunications industries, 
and has evaluated performance of regulatory regimes, rather than reasons for their adoption. 
Hlasny (2006, 2008a, 2008b) reviews these studies. Economic studies of the causes of regulatory 
reform have identified various political factors behind deregulation in utility industries (Bailey & 
Pack,  1995):  presence  of  infrastructure  necessary  for  restructuring  (Comnes  et  al.,  1995); 
political  party  in  power  and  composition  of  public  service  commissions;  commissioner  re-





(Hilton, 1972; Stigler, 1971; Posner, 1974; Peltzman, 1976; Becker, 1983); and satisfaction with 
restructuring in surrounding states or industries (Flippen & Mitchell, 2003). Other economic 
factors include monopolistic behavior and high prices of incumbent firms (McCraw, 1975; Ando 
& Palmer, 1998; Hlasny, 2010); recouping of stranded costs of utilities’ long-term investments 
(Flood, 1992; Gilbert & Newbery, 1994; Salant, 1995; White et al., 1996); and other economic 
trends (Joskow et al., 1989; Dalbo & Ditella, 2003). 
Empirical evidence on the causes of deregulation has been mixed. In the electricity industry, 
the process of regulator-selection has had little impact on the stringency of regulation in terms of 
the consumer prices (Costello, 1984; Primeaux et al., 1984; Primeaux & Mann, 1986; Boyes & 
McDowell, 1989; Campbell, 1996; Kwoka, 2002; Besley & Coate, 2003) and the allowed rates 
of return (Joskow, 1972; Hagerman & Ratchford, 1978; Harris & Navarro, 1983), but some 
impact on the length of regulatory lag (Atkinson & Nowell, 1994). The process of creation of 
consumer advocate groups affected the stringency of the regulator’s price setting and cost review 
(Holburn & Spiller, 2002; Holburn & Vandenbergh, 2006). The expected gains to consumers 
from lowering incumbent utilities’ prices resulted in restructuring in the energy industry (White 
et al., 1996). The level and variance of prices in a state and prices in neighboring states have 
influenced the likelihood to restructure the energy industry in a state through opportunities for 
the use of utilities’ reserve margins (Ando & Palmer, 1998). In telecommunications, the effect of 
the  regulator-setting  process  (Smart,  1994)  and  of  campaign  contributions  (Edwards  & 
Waverman, 2004; DeFigueiredo & Edwards, 2005) on pricing has been noted. 
 
3. Estimable model of regulatory choice 
The  empirical  analysis  herein  is  loosely  based  on  a  theoretical  model  of  rational  regulatory 
choice, following Peltzman’s (1976) capture model. At the center of the regulatory process is a 
regulator who chooses among regulatory regimes Pij with the objective to maximize a measure of 
his political returns Wi(Pij). The regulator’s return may be in the statewide consumer or producer 
surplus, state revenue, chances of re-election, financial contributions, popularity, prestige, sense 
of righteousness, or a combination of these. The regulator selects the regime that  yields the 
greatest returns. 
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In this expression, subscript i is for the regulator, and j is for the utility under consideration. 
Pij is a categorical policy variable whose Π possible realizations include the decision to retain the 
status quo regime. Regulator i’s political returns are a sum of the returns obtained from G groups 
of  stakeholders.  G  includes  non-overlapping  groups  such  as  other  governmental  bodies, 
taxpayers, voters, different classes of consumers, shareholders, utility workers, other utilities and 
others. The returns from each group g depend on the size of the group, ng, and the measure of 
support from a typical member of g for the policy reform in question, fg(Pij). The form of fg(·) 
depends on the marginal support that a typical member of g tenders for Pij when the present 
value of his wealth increases by one dollar as a result of introduction of Pij. fg(·) may thus depend 
on an individual’s existing wealth, time preference and risk aversion. 
fg can be a probability that an individual grant his support for Pij, or the money or utility 
transfer to the regulator, conditional on Pij, or a vector of variables of interest. fg(·) may be 
increasing  and  weakly  concave,  because  of  positive  non-increasing  marginal  contribution  of 
individuals’ net benefits of regulation to their support for Pij. Different groups may have different 
functional forms of fg. Without information on the exact variable whose value state commission 
strives to maximize, no other restriction should be placed on fg. Specifically, fg(Pij) may depend 
on the present value of direct benefits from particular policy reform, costs to implement and 
enforce the new regime, and mitigate or appease opposition, and costs of organizing within the 
group g. 
Direct benefits from policy reform may depend on the change in individuals’ earnings (e.g., 
from  off-system  sales)  or savings  (from  lower  prices)  anticipated  if new  regime  is  adopted, 
including  direct  costs  of  adoption.  Costs  to  enforce  a  policy  may  depend  on  the  necessary 
spending (e.g., information gathering, and dissemination or concealment) and transfers to other 
groups to ensure adoption of a policy. Costs of organizing a group may depend on the difficulty 
of  tallying  individual  members’  valuation  and  organizing  them  (overcoming  free  riding  and 
mobilizing members), and may therefore be a function of the size of a group. Direct benefits 
from policy reform, Tg, may be positive or negative. We may have  ( ) 0
1 ¹ ∑ =
G
g g T  for a particular 
Pij, or  ( ) 0
1 ¹ ∑
P
= ij P g T  for a particular g. Costs to enforce a policy, Kg, may be Kg(Pij)<0 if g 





differed in their voting rights or weights in the regulator’s objective). Both Tg(·) and Kg(·) may 
depend on the sizes of other interest groups nh. 
In  reality,  regulatory  decisions  are  not  made  by  the  state  commission  alone.  Various 
stakeholders,  including  the  utility  in  question,  have  input  in  the  process.  Back  and  forth 
negotiation weakens the power that the regulator or utility may exercise in implementing policy 
reform  (Mathios  &  Rogers,  1989;  Greenstein  et  al.,  1995).  Equation  1  allows  for  these 
considerations. The regulator faces a tradeoff in the support he receives from different interest 
groups, and selects policy reform Pij
* that maximizes their sum. Knowledge of the individual 
parts of Equation 1 would shed light on why particular regulatory regime is adopted at a utility-
regulator pair at a particular point in time, and which forms of regulation are likely to be used in 
the future. 
For simplicity of presentation, Equation 1 omits time subscripts. The regulator’s problem is 
of course dynamic. The size of individual interest groups, the net benefits expected by them and 
the  rules  of  admissibility  of their  support  change over time.  Flows  of  net  benefits,  costs  of 
lobbying and of organizing groups occur at different points in time, with different certainty. 
Furthermore, the regulator’s identity and the form of his political returns may change over time. 
 
3.1 Empirical approach 
Decisions about alternative policies should be studied jointly, since the regulator has a number of 
deregulatory options from which to choose, and the decision to adopt a particular policy depends 
on  the  set  of  available  policy  options.  The  probability  and  timing  of  implementation  of  a 
particular mechanism are thought to depend on expectations of all stakeholders regarding the net 
benefits from a particular form of deregulation, as compared to other policy alternatives. 
One can study the revealed choice at each regulator-utility pair to identify factors affecting 
the decisions as well as the individual parts of Wi(Pij).  Ideally, one would infer the support 
function fg(·) of a typical stakeholder in each interest group g for each considered deregulatory 
regime  Pij.  Unfortunately,  information  on  utility  functions  of  individual  public  service 
commissions and all stakeholders is missing. The exact functional form and arguments of fg(·) 
are unknown, and are difficult to estimate for policy regimes that have not been enacted. The 





or utility level. As a result, the following empirical model studies factors behind deregulation at 
the levels of the public commission and the utility. 
Given the available data, several conjectures suggested by previous literature can be tested. 
One  conjecture  related  to  the  capture  theory  is  that  the  process  of  selecting  public  service 
commissioners  may  influence  the  form  of  deregulation.  Whether  the  selection  is  through 
appointment by state legislature or through public election; number of (re)appointments in the 
current year; and the length of election cycles may matter. Unfortunately, the direction of these 
effects  is  a  priori  unclear,  as  it  depends  on  commissioners’  campaign  programs  and  voters’ 
sentiments, unobservable in this analysis. 
Another conjecture testable using the available data is that previous experience with similar 
forms of deregulation in other industries in the state, or in the gas market in surrounding states, 
yields demonstration effects that impact the expected benefits of deregulation. Provided that the 
previous experience is positive, one could expect positive demonstration effects. 
Among economic factors, one conjecture is that higher consumer prices at a utility encourage 
deregulation. They may increase the expected price reductions under deregulation relative to the 
status quo. A benevolent regulator may be sympathetic to the consumers’ cause particularly at 
high prices.
1 
Another  interesting  economic  conjecture  is  that  the  measure  of  effective  industry 
concentration encourages the adoption of price caps. Even though most utilities are monopolies 
in their local markets, they compete to attract off-grid customers and to win regulator’s support 
in  cost  review  cases  and  performance  evaluations  (e.g.,  service  quality  awards).  For  these 
reasons  utilities  strive  to  compare  favorably  to  other  utilities  in  the  state.  The  higher  the 
concentration of utilities, the less effective competition of this sort may exist, and the more of 
monopolistic and exploitative behavior one may observe. The regulator may then prefer price 
caps to rate-of-return regulation. Price caps treat a utility in isolation, fixing the service quality 
and other operating standards, and inducing the utility to increase its efficiency, regardless how 
low competitive pressures from outside are. Sliding-scale and consumer-choice programs, on the 
other hand, may be expected to operate best in industries with lower concentration. Sliding-scale 
                                                 
1 High prices may signify improprieties by the utility. Also, while utilities may be thought to have constant marginal 
utility of money, consumers’ marginal utility increases with prices. Regulator may be particularly sympathetic to 
residential consumers, who face diminishing marginal utility of money; for whom utility bills represent a large 





plans are based on a comparison of a utility’s performance against the performance of other 
utilities.  Among  sliding  scale  plans,  earnings-sharing  plans  reward  utilities  explicitly  for 
acquiring new customers, and margin-sharing plans reward a utility for sharing its resources with 
other utilities profitably. Consumer choice programs require the presence or the potential for 
entry of competing providers of unbundled services. 
A related conjecture is that utility size affects the expected benefits from deregulation. Larger 
utilities have larger interest groups (ng) that may be better organized; have generally been in 
existence longer and may have earned more trust from the regulator; and may be perceived as 
less competitive by general public (because of their sheer size). For these reasons, utility size 
may affect the benefits from deregulation expected by the utility and consumers. A priori, it is 
unclear  whether  utilities’  size  should  be  related  positively  or  negatively  to  the  hazard  of 
deregulation  relative  to  the  status  quo.  Among  the  possible  forms  of  deregulation,  we  may 
believe that larger utility size is conducive of utility-level incentive programs. Utility size is 
unimportant or may be harmful when regulatory reform relies on effective competition among 
utilities. 
One may formulate other hypotheses of interest beside those above. Unfortunately, many 
hypotheses  cannot  be  tested  using  currently  available  data.  In  particular,  direct  pressure  by 
various  interest  groups,  or  utilities’  rates  of  return,  stranded  costs  and  reserve  margins  are 
missing. Some conjectures are difficult to test because of interplay of competing effects in the 
real world. For example, incomes affect consumers’ marginal utility of money, but also voting 
behavior, preferences and attitude toward risk; prices of alternative fuels affect each stakeholder 
differently, and may be correlated with unobserved features of statewide gas industry. 
 
3.2 Cox model of time to deregulation 
The Cox proportional-hazard model is estimated to predict the time to deregulation of utilities 
that  have  not  deregulated  yet,  using  information  on  the  timing  of  deregulation  at  presently 
deregulated utilities. The standard model is advanced to allow for competing risks of adoption of 
one or more of the alternative deregulatory plans. In a discrete-time model, the hazard of an 
event is the probability that the event occurs in a time period, conditional on the fact that it has 





ij  in  year  t,  λijπt,  is  frequently  modeled  as  an  exponential  function  of  determining  factors, 
multiplied by an estimated baseline hazard rate of adoption: λijπt = exp(γπ · Yijt)·λ00πt. In this 
expression, Yijt is a vector of time-varying explanatory variables specific to each regulator-utility 
pair ij, γπ is the associated vector of coefficients specific to policy π, and λ00πt is a duration-
dependence baseline hazard rate of policy π as of time t. 
Yijt includes time-varying factors at the levels of utility, state regulator, and nation-wide gas 
market. To the extent that each regulator-utility pair has a particular expectation of conditions 
resulting  under  each  policy  alternative,  the  model  should  include  policy-specific  controls. 
However, such expectations could differ between the regulator and the utility, and information 
on such expectations is missing. Detailed provisions of each utility-specific mechanism are also 
unknown. 
λ00πt is the hazard rate of adopting π conditional on all control variables being set to zero, and 
therefore does not depend on the regulator’s or the utility’s characteristics. Typically, one needs 
to estimate λ00πt along with all model coefficients. This need can be eliminated using a partial-
likelihood  maximization  method,  by  focusing  only  on  the  contribution  of  ij’s  time  to 
deregulation to the ordering of times across all regulator-utility pairs, conditional on the set of 
regulator-utility pairs that have not deregulated as of t. 
To allow for competing risks in the above Cox model, the hazard of adoption of a policy 
must be independent of the choice set of available deregulatory programs.
2 Empirically, only 
some combinations of policies or progressions between policies are feasible. However, modeling 
of the allowed relationships among available policies would be difficult. It is implicitly assumed 
that  any  policy  can  be  implemented  alongside  any  other  policy,  and  arbitrary  progression 




                                                 
2 To evaluate reasonableness of this assumption, the results of a joint competing-risks model are compared against a 
model stratified by policy alternatives or by distinct time periods (Harrell and Lee 1986). The results are available 
on request. Since restructuring became a viable policy option only in year 1999 (after the initial pilot programs 
proved feasible, and upon support from federal legislation), periods 1996-1998 and 1999-2004 are distinct in the 
effective menu of available policies, and can be used for stratification. (The experience with restructuring in 
California and Georgia became known only in the second time period. Delaware and Wisconsin also discontinued 






Data for this analysis come from several public sources, most importantly the Department of 
Energy, National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, and webpages of state public 
service commissions. The data covers all large-capacity utilities in the continental US reporting 
on the Department of Energy’s EIA-176 form during 1996-2004. To limit the heterogeneity of 
utilities in the sample, three-quarters of utilities with the smallest capacity are dropped, reducing 
the sample size from 2,222 utilities (12,941 observations) to 659 utilities (3,646 observations). 
Small utilities appear to be regulated differently than medium-size and large utilities, and have 
other systematic differences. Information on why each of these utilities is different is missing, 
and dropping them appears to be the best option. The analysis was repeated using all utilities, 
and all qualitative results remain valid. 
Hawaii and Alaska are outliers in the dataset, both conceptually and empirically, and suffer 
from  missing  data.  These  states  are  excluded.  Californian  utility  industries  have  undergone 
extensive structural and political changes in recent years. During the period under analysis, the 
state experienced energy industry price-fixing scandals, financial crises, and the resulting policy 
changes. After evaluating the effects of the uncompetitive activities on regulation in the region, 
California was not dropped from the analysis, because its presence does not alter the results 
greatly. 
Information on the form of regulation comes from a custom survey of state public service 
commissions, conducted for accuracy three times between 2001 and 2007 (Hlasny, 2006, 2008a). 
Table 2 describes the presence of deregulatory programs in the sample, including their joint 
distribution.  Information  on  the  composition  of  state  public  service  commissions,  system  of 
selection of commissioners, and times of (re)appointments comes from NARUC (2010), Beecher 
(2007, 2010), and commissions’ websites. Other data on state and national elections are taken 










Program  States  Utilities  Observations 
Consumer choice–pilot or implemented
a  22  216  721 
Price cap
b  4  7  20 
Sliding scale plan
ab  21  37  134 
Sample size  47  659  3,646 
The reported number of states, utilities and observations have information on years prior to 
deregulation, needed for the analysis. Programs implemented before 1996 are dropped. 
a Of these numbers, 10 states, 16 utilities and 29 observations have both consumer choice programs and 
sliding scale plans. 
b Of these numbers, 2 states, 4 utilities and 8 observations have both price caps and sliding scale plans. 
 
Table 2. Inventory of Policies in the Sample 
 
Number  of  commissioner  positions  open  for  (re)appointment,  process  of  selecting  new 
commissioners, and length of election cycles control for time-variation in regulatory motives at 
the state level. Size and composition of the commission, and political party prevalent in the state 
legislature control for party objectives. Controlling for the state commissions’ experience with 
deregulation is the number of deregulatory programs in the gas market in surrounding states, and 
the number of deregulatory programs in other utility industries within the state, as of year t-1. 
Herfindahl-Hirschman  Index  (HHI)  for  the  concentration  of  utilities  in  the  state  gas 
distribution market measures inversely the amount of interaction among utilities and strength of 
competitive forces in the industry. State is chosen as the definition of utilities’ market out of 
conviction that this measure of market concentration is closely related to the effective amount of 
competition that a utility faces, and for a lack of better information. State boundaries provide 
some effective restrictions on utilities’ operations (e.g., requirements to be licensed in a state to 
compete there, and to deal with transmission companies in a state), and so the HHI in the state 
market is expected to be a better measure of the effective interaction among utilities regardless of 
state size than, say, a uniform-size market definition. 
State  per  capita  incomes,  unemployment  rates,  bankruptcy  rates,  personal  and  business 
income tax rates proxy for the fiscal environment in the state, including consumers’ ability to pay. 
Residential  prices,  capacity,  operation  type  and  ownership  are  used  to  control  for  utilities’ 
observable and unobservable time-varying characteristics and performance. 
With the exception of categorical variables and the HHI, all variables are normalized by the 
nationwide average of the variables for a year. This normalization picks up relative differences 





specific shocks. Units of the normalized variables are the percentage deviations from the national 
mean. Another set of controls is obtained by normalizing variables by their average for the utility 
(or  state)  in  all  prior  years.  This  normalization  picks  up  year-to-year  shocks  rather  than 
differences across utilities, thus measuring time-varying factors at a utility. Both sets of variables 
– those normalized by a nationwide average, and those normalized by a utility’s prior average – 
were evaluated simultaneously. This allowed the model to distinguish variation in a regressor 
across utilities, and over time, as distinct factors affecting the time to deregulation. Furthermore, 
the mean of these normalized variables is zero. This implies that the computed baseline hazards 
can be interpreted as the hazards of adoption of a policy by a typical utility in a typical state. 
Some of the needed variables are unobservable or measured imprecisely in the data. Policies 
are measured by binary indicators for the adoption of the policies at a utility, regardless of the 
detailed provisions of the policies. This is a limitation to the extent that the same policies may 
vary across utilities by their incentive power, number of affected customer classes, number of 
customers, agreed  upon  time  span  and other  factors.  Utilities  with  the same  policy  are  thus 
implicitly assumed to be regulated subject to similar gas procurement, pricing, cost recovery and 
rate-of-return rules. In reality, policy with a greater incentive power, extent and time span may 
be more difficult to implement. Inclusion of these factors would render the above model difficult 
to solve. The degrees of freedom would also fall with the number of categories of regulatory 
outcomes. Finally, information on the detailed provisions is often missing or unclear. 
Earnings-sharing, margin-sharing and gas-cost incentive plans are studied jointly as sliding-
scale programs. Some of these programs are adopted very rarely. In the analysis, even fewer 
occurrences may appear if some of the independent variables are missing for a utility with the 
program. With a small portion of the sample under policy treatment, the estimated coefficients 
would be imprecise. The second reason is that the degrees of freedom in the analysis falls with 
the number of competing policies, because each policy requires estimation of another set of 
coefficients and another baseline hazard. Making different sliding-scale plans interchangeable 









This  section reports  the  results  of  Cox  regressions,  estimating  the time-dependent  hazard  of 
adoption  of  each  policy.  Table  3  reports  on  the  Cox  hazard  models  where  all  deregulatory 
programs are evaluated jointly, thus controlling for the risk of adoption of other programs at the 
utility. Hazards presented in Table 3 account for the fact that several alternative policies compete 
for adoption simultaneously.
3 Baseline hazard in this model is assumed the same across the three 
policies, but most regressors are allowed to contribute differentially to the respective hazards. 
Each policy thus has a different hazard of adoption. 
 
                                                 
3 First, competing deregulatory programs were evaluated individually. In the study of implementation of policy A, 
utilities adopting policy B were treated as non-deregulated, and their observations as right-censored. Because 
competing policies were treated as equivalent to the benchmark rate-of-return regulation, coefficients in this model 
are interpreted as contributions of a variable to the hazard of adoption of a given policy, against the hazard of 
adopting another policy (including retention of the benchmark policy). An important limitation of the policy-specific 
model is that it evaluates the hazard of adoption of only one policy at a time, treating all other alternatives as 
equivalent to the benchmark. It is likely that the decision between rate-of-return regulation and restructuring, for 
example, depends on whether the utility currently operates under rate-of-return, price-cap or sliding-scale regulation. 
In addition, one of several types of deregulation can result, and a low estimated hazard of restructuring should not 
necessarily be interpreted as a high hazard of retention of rate-of-return regulation. One must remember what policy 
outcomes are contained and most prevalent in the benchmark when interpreting the coefficients. For these reasons, 






  Sliding scale  Price cap  Choice  Sliding scale  Price cap  Choice 
Commissioners  0.005  1.111   -0.711***   -1.781*   1.562   -1.110***  
 chosen in t  (0.715)  (0.873)  (0.168)  (1.052)  (1.105)  (0.214) 
Appointed  0.799  0.27   1.154***   0.022   -3.048**    0.455* 
 v. elected  (0.550)  (0.618)  (0.268)  (1.047)  (1.441)  (0.244) 
Election cycle  0.042  -0.308   -0.201***   0.1   -1.234***    -0.197**  
 length  (0.215)  (0.298)  (0.068)  (0.480)  (0.269)  (0.084) 
Democrats   0.207**   0.184   -0.102***   0.154   0.889**    -0.158***  
 on commission  (0.085)  (0.157)  (0.033)  (0.174)  (0.362)  (0.049) 
Democrats  -1.668  -0.164  -0.547  0.328   6.410*    -2.183***  
 in Upper House  (1.051)  (1.613)  (0.672)  (1.679)  (3.888)  (0.717) 
Commission   -0.497**   -0.788   0.323***    -0.888*    -2.616***    0.388***  
members  (0.251)  (0.507)  (0.065)  (0.517)  (0.769)  (0.105) 
Sliding scale plans              -1.037       1.084***  
 in electr. industry              (0.699)      (0.264) 
Price caps                   6.134***    -1.498***  
 in telecom industry                  (1.960)  (0.297) 
Price caps                  0.236   -0.443*  
 in electr. industry                  (1.163)  (0.227) 
Sliding scale plans in              -0.138       0.590***  
 gas industr. in region              (0.314)      (0.081) 
Price caps in                  -0.194   -0.430***  
 gas industr. in region                  (0.575)  (0.145) 
Choice programs in                        -1.658***  
 gas industr. in region                       (0.360) 
Price of gas               0.290***    0.077***    -0.117***  
 v. other utilities              (0.063)  (0.020)  (0.034) 
Price of gas               -0.797***       0.079 
 v. previous years              (0.198)      (0.051) 
Utility volume               0.006***    0.023***   0.001 
 v. other utilities              (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.001) 
Herfindahl              0.224   0.786**   -0.051 
 -Hirschmann Index              (0.252)  (0.326)  (0.062) 
Pers. income               1.234***    1.417**    0.418***  
v. other states              (0.335)  (0.608)  (0.102) 
Pers. income               -3.652**    -6.629***    -3.566***  
 v. previous years              (1.619)  (1.711)  (0.361) 
Business income tax               0.147**        0.147**  
 v. other states              (0.061)      (0.061) 
Records (Utilities) [States]  10,938 (659) [47]  10,257 (657) [47] 
Log pseudo-likelihood  -2,134.51  -1,635.75 
Chi-square  400.03  1,275.78 
* statistically significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%, two-sided tests. 
Baseline hazards are same across policies except for differential contributions of regressors. Standard errors are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation at utility. Monetary terms are in 1996$. Price and volume of gas 
sold are at utility level. Type of operation and ownership of utilities are controlled for. State prices of coal and electricity 
are controlled for in the economic model. Number of programs in region excludes program at that utility. Commission 
and legislature data, programs in other industries, fuel prices, income, unemployment, income tax and Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index are at state level. 
 






First three columns in Table 3 make the hazard of deregulation a simple function of political 
factors at the state level. Selection process of state commissioners, size of the state commission, 
and political party in power control for the political climate in the commission and in the public 
sphere. In particular, the number of seats up for reassignment on the state commission, party 
responsible for the selection, and the composition and tenure of state commission control for 
commissioners objectives and the climate in which they make decisions. Political leaning in the 
Upper House of state legislature controls for state-level political climate. The three columns on 
the right control for regulatory experience from other industries and economic factors, to identify 
better  the partial  effects  of  political  factors  on  regulatory  reform.  Deregulation  status  in the 
telecommunications and the electricity industries in the state, and deregulation status of natural 
gas utilities in other states in the region control for demonstration effects. Economic control 
variables at the utility level include residential price of gas, utility’s capacity, type and ownership. 
At the state level, other economic controls include concentration of the gas industry, state per 
capita income, business income tax rate, and prices of related fuels. They help proxy for fiscal 
and regulatory climate in the state. 
First six rows in Table 3 report on the effects of political factors on the hazard of adoption of 
the three competing deregulatory regimes. The number of commissioner seats up for election or 
reelection  in  a  year  is  positively  related  to  the  hazard  of  deregulation  via  price  caps,  and 
negatively related to the hazard of other forms of deregulation. It appears that deregulation via 
sliding-scale and consumer choice programs is politically more difficult (statistically significant) 
than adoption of price caps or retention of status quo in years when many commissioners seek to 
be appointed. The process of commissioner selection also appears to affect regulatory reform, 
with  appointments  by  state  legislature  favoring  sliding  scale  regulation  or  restructuring,  and 
public elections favoring price caps. Thus, when public sentiment is needed in commissioner 
appointments, state commissions tend to push through price caps, even against the status quo 
rate-of-return regulation. They appear to shy away from other forms of deregulation. This is 
further confirmed in the third row: The more often the commissioner selection is conducted – 
because of shorter election cycles – the higher the hazard of price caps compared to consumer 





elections in a year, the involvement of general public in them, and frequency of elections, tend to 
favor price caps, over other possible deregulatory regimes or the status quo. 
The  fourth  and  fifth  rows  report  on  the  effects  of  political-party  composition  of  state 
commissions  and  state  legislatures.  Democratic  leaning  of  the  commission  and  of  state 
legislature tends to favor deregulation via price caps (weakly even sliding scale plans) against 
restructuring. This may agree with our beliefs regarding Democratic and Republic legislators’ 
attitudes toward competitive forces in the marketplace and toward economic governance. One 
interesting finding worth studying further is that commissions that have fewer members tend to 
favor price cap and sliding-scale deregulation, and avoid restructuring. This may be an artifact of 
complexity  inherent  in  full-blown  restructuring,  and  of  other  facets  of  the  decision-making 
process behind regulatory reform. 
The following six rows in Table 3 show that policies adopted in other utility industries in the 
state, and in the gas industry in other states have a strong effect on the hazard of adoption of the 
same policy at a gas utility. Prevalence of price caps in the telecommunications and electricity 
industries  in  the  state  affects  the  hazard  of  price  cap  deregulation  positively,  and  that  of 
restructuring negatively. Prevalence of sliding scale plans in the electricity industry in the state 
surprisingly has a negative effect on the hazard of this form of deregulation in the gas industry 
(insignificant),  and  a  positive  effect  on  the hazard  of  restructuring.
4 Deregulation in  the  gas 
industry in surrounding states appears to have the unexpected effect on deregulation in a state: 
experience  with  restructuring  (sliding-scale  plans  or  price  caps,  respectively)  in  surrounding 
states lowers the hazard of restructuring (sliding-scale or price-cap adoption, respectively) in a 
state.  This  is  significant  for  the  hazard  of  restructuring.  The  one  expected  result  is  that  the 
prevalence of sliding-scale plans (price caps, respectively) in surrounding states raises (lowers, 
respectively)  the  hazard  of  restructuring  in  a  state.  Once  again  we  find  a  strong  negative 
relationship between the usage of price caps, and of consumer choice programs across utility 
industries in a state, and across U.S. regions. On the other hand, there appears to be a positive 
relationship between the adoption of sliding-scale plans and consumer choice programs. 
                                                 
4 This variable, as well as sliding-scale and consumer-choice regulation used in other states, price of gas compared 
to previous years, and business income taxes are omitted from the price-cap regression to preserve degrees of 
freedom. Table 2 has already reported that there are only 7 subjects (20 observations) adopting price caps in our 
sample. If some explanatory variables are missing for those utilities, we would have even fewer adoptions in the 
regression. It also turns out that information on utilities' prices is sometimes missing. Business taxes are also less 





The next three rows show coefficients on utility-level economic variables. First, an attempt is 
made  to  differentiate  the  effect  of  premiums  in  utilities’  residential  prices  relative  to  other 
utilities, and jumps in prices relative to previous years. The first variable is normalized by its 
mean across all utilities for the year. These coefficients are interpreted as contributions of a 
percentage  premium  in  the  variable,  compared  to  values  in  other  utilities,  to  the  hazard  of 
adoption. The second variable is normalized by its up-to-date mean at the utility level. These 
coefficients are interpreted as contributions of a percentage change in the variable, compared to 
its previous levels, to the hazard of adoption. Residential price of gas affects the hazard of sliding 
scale plans and price caps positively, and consumer choice negatively. Compared to the levels in 
previous years, higher prices of gas tend to decrease the hazard of sliding scale plans. These 
price effects may together imply that utilities that are less efficient than their peers – in the sense 
of charging higher regulated prices – tend to be assigned incentive regulation tailored to the 
particular utilities: price caps or specific forms of sliding scale plans. Regulators may hope to 
change utilities’ performance under new utility-level payoff regimes. Furthermore, sliding-scale 
plans may be granted only when the utilities show some improvement in prices over previous 
years.
5 
Utility’s capacity increases the hazard of deregulation via sliding scale plans and price caps, 
and  has  no  effect  on  the  prospect  of  restructuring.  Although  the  effect  of  utility  size  on 
deregulation (holding market concentration fixed) is theoretically unclear, the estimated effect is 
not surprising, implying that the amount of resources and experience – and perhaps even the 
effective or perceived market power, or ability to lobby regulators, or absolute level of benefits 
to ratepayers – at the utility can raise the expected success of utility-level deregulation. These 
same factors are unimportant or counterproductive to facilitating competition under restructuring. 
The last four rows show the estimated effects of state-level economic controls, as varying 
across states or years. HHI for the state gas market has a positive effect on the hazard of sliding 
scale plans and price caps, and no effect on restructuring. Thus, concentration of utilities in the 
market has similar influence on deregulatory efforts as utilities’ size, a nice expected result. 
                                                 
5 Another explanation of this system of coefficients is that the two variables – demeaned across all utilities, or 
normalized by the average for all previous years – are collinear, and their coefficients may be spurious. However, 
the coefficients are statistically highly significant, and the two variables have low correlation. This indicates that 





The next two rows attempt to differentiate the effect of premiums in income levels compared 
to  other  states,  and  jumps  in  income  levels  compared  to  previous  years.  Higher  per  capita 
incomes  (relative  to  other  states)  are  associated  with  higher  hazard  of  adoption  of  each 
deregulatory program. Jumps in per capita earnings (relative to previous years) are associated 
with a large fall in the hazard of adoption of all programs. Variation in corporate income tax 
rates across states is related positively to the hazard of sliding scale plans and consumer choice. 
(To  preserve  degrees  of  freedom,  the  coefficients  were  restricted  to  be  identical  in  the  two 
equations, and the variable was omitted from the price-cap equation.) 
There is one potential limitation of the models presented in Table 3 that should be mentioned. 
The hazard model relied on the assumption of proportional hazards – for any two utilities, the 
ratio of the estimated hazards should remain constant regardless what other plans are available. 
Kaplan-Meier observed and predicted survival curves can help evaluate this assumption. Refer to 
Figure  1.  The  closer  the  observed  values  are  to  the  predicted  values,  the  less  likely  the 
proportional hazards assumption has been violated. The predicted curves are very close to the 
observed  values,  thus  alleviating  fears  that  the  important  assumption  was  violated.  This  is 
confirmed in Figure 2, showing the Kaplan-Meier log-log survival curves of individual policies 
against log-time. The proportional-hazards assumption appears to be valid for these survival 
curves, because the curves are nearly perfectly parallel. 
 
 







Figure 2. Log-Log Survival Curves for Competing Deregulatory Regimes 
 
Figure 3 shows the baseline hazard estimates (smoothed using kernel density estimation) for 
each deregulatory regime at the means of all covariates. The hazard of adoption of sliding-scale 
and price cap forms of regulation falls over time, whereas the hazard of restructuring rises. This 
corresponds to the fact that the vast bulk of the sliding-scale plans and price caps were adopted 
in the late 1990s, while consumer choice programs started to spread only after the year 2000. The 
three graphs indicate that the assumption of equal baseline hazards across policies would not be 
valid. Clearly, no two policy alternatives can be combined into one, and each policy should be 
modeled with own baseline hazard. 
 
 
(a) Sliding scale regulation          (b) Price cap regulation       (c) Consumer choice regulation 







This study has evaluated selected political and economic factors affecting the likelihood and 
timing of regulatory reform in the  gas distribution market. Three deregulatory regimes were 
studied jointly – sliding-scale incentive regulation, price cap regulation, and restructuring with 
consumer  choice.  Results  indicate  that  the  process  of  selecting  state  public  service 
commissioners is an important determinant of regulatory outcomes at utilities. The extent of 
commissioner elections in a year, the involvement of general public in them, and frequency of 
elections, tend to favor price caps, over other possible deregulatory regimes or the status quo. 
Political-party composition of state commissions and state legislatures contributes. Democratic 
leaning of the commission and of state legislature tends to favor price caps against restructuring. 
Adoption of price caps and consumer choice programs in other utility industries in the state 
has a positive and significant demonstration effect on the adoption of these norms in the gas 
industry. Demonstration effects from the gas industry in surrounding states are weak and unclear. 
This may correspond with the fact that policy reforms have not been successful in all states 
where  they  were  undertaken  during  1996-2004.  Whether  demonstration  effects  will  become 
clearer and positive in the coming years presumably depends on actual performance of existing 
programs. 
After  controlling  for  a  number  of  political  and  economic  factors,  there  remains  a  clear 
negative association between the prevalence of consumer choice – together with sliding scale – 
regimes on the one hand, and price cap deregulation on the other hand, across utility industries in 
a state, and across U.S. regions. The systematic negative association between restructuring and 
price cap regulation may be caused by the usage of price cap regulation to block restructuring, 
and the adoption of sliding scale plans as a preparatory step for successful restructuring. This 
association  may  also  result  from  the  correlatedness  of  political  climates,  electoral  systems, 
composition  of  gas  industry,  and  availability  of  resources  (such  as  gas  wells,  underground 
storages or pipeline capacity) across U.S. states. Sliding-scale regulation appears to have similar 
criteria for adoption as restructuring, while the criteria for price cap regulation are contrary. 
At the utility level, residential prices and utilities’ size affect the hazard that the utility will be 





consumer choice. The estimated effect of utilities’ size may imply that the amount of resources 
and experience – and perhaps even the effective or perceived market power, or ability to lobby 
regulators,  or  absolute  level  of  benefits  to  ratepayers  –  at  the  utility  can  raise  the  expected 
success of utility-level deregulation. These same factors are unimportant or counterproductive to 
facilitating competition under restructuring. Concentration of utilities in the market has similar 
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